OF MR. LOCKE’S ACCOUNT OF
PERSONAL IDENTITY

By Thomas Reid

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In a long chapter upon Identity and Diversity, Mr. Locke has made
many ingenious and just observations, and some which I think
cannot be defended. … Mr. Locke tells us … "that personal identity,
that is, the sameness of a rational being, consists in consciousness
alone, and, as far as this consciousness can be extended
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity
of that person. So that whatever has the consciousness of present
and past actions is the same person to whom they belong."

This doctrine has some strange consequences, which the author
was aware of. Such as, that if the same consciousness can be
transferred from one intelligent being to another, which he thinks
we cannot show to be impossible, then two or twenty intelligent
beings may be the same person. And if the intelligent being may
lose the consciousness of the actions done by him, which surely is
possible, then he is not the person that did those actions; so that
one intelligent being may be two or twenty different persons, if he
shall so often lose the consciousness of this former actions.

There is another consequence of this doctrine, which follows no
less necessarily, though Mr. Locke probably did not see it. It is, that
a man may be, and at the same time not be, the person that did a
particular action:

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at
school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the
enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in
advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be
possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his
having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he
was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost
the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it
follows, from Mr. Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at
school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who
took the standard is the same person who was made a general.
Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is
the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the
general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging;
therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not the person
who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is
not, the same person with him who was flogged at school.
Leaving the consequences of this doctrine to those who have leisure to trace them, we may observe, with regard to the doctrine itself:

First, that Mr. Locke attributes to consciousness the conviction we have of our past actions, as if a man may now be conscious of what he did twenty years ago. It is impossible to understand the meaning of this, unless by consciousness he meant memory, the only faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of our past actions. …

Secondly, it may be observed, that, in this doctrine, not only is consciousness confounded with memory, but, which is still more strange, personal identity is confounded with the evidence which we have or our personal identity. It is very true, that my remembrance that I did such a thing is the evidence I have that I am the identical person who did it. And this, I am apt to think, Mr. Locke meant. But to say that my remembrance that I did such a thing, or my consciousness, makes me the person who did it, is, in my apprehension, an absurdity too gross to be entertained by any man who attends to the meaning of it; for it is to attribute to memory or consciousness a strange magical power of producing its object, though that object must have existed before the memory or consciousness which produced it. Consciousness is the testimony of one faculty; memory is the testimony of another faculty; and to say that the testimony is the cause of the thing testified, this surely is absurd, if any thing be, and could not have been said by Mr. Locke, if he had not confounded the testimony with the thing testified. …

Thirdly, is it not strange that the sameness or identity of a person should consist in a thing which is continually changing, and is not any two minutes the same? Our consciousness, our memory, and every operation of the mind, are still flowing like the water of a river, or like time itself. The consciousness I have this moment can no more be the same consciousness I had last moment, than this moment can be the last moment. Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence. Consciousness, and every kind of thought, are transient and momentary, and have no continued existence; and, therefore, if personal identity consisted in consciousness, it would certainly follow, that no man is the same person any two moments of his life; and as the right and justice of reward and punishment are founded on personal identity, no man could be responsible for his actions. …